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BRIEFING 
ESTABLISHING THE EU EXTERNAL ACTION 
SERVICE (EEAS) 





STATE OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE EEAS AND REMIT 
 
There is some strategic consensus emerging around the extension of the EEAS beyond its 
direct remit, with clear safeguards. 
In those negotiations it is important to keep focus on the fact that the treaty states explicitly 
that the EEAS will be established to support the High Representative in her role as High 
Representative of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 
Therefore any negotiated political outcome that extends the EEAS beyond this remit, can only 





The Lisbon Treaty introduced a ‘double-hatted’ function for the new function of EU High 
Representative of Foreign Policy and Security Policy. 
The High Representative would combine this role with the role of Vice-President of the 
European Commission, so allowing her to credibly represent all the aspects of the EU 
intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the community-based 
common policies with an external dimension, notably trade, fisheries, development co-
operation and humanitarian assistance. 
The Lisbon Treaty does not establish a new class of double-hatted officials, or institutions, and 
neither does it establish a new set of double-hatted policies, decisions, procedures or laws. 
 
 
Page | 2  
FROM DOUBLE-HATTED TO TRIPLE-HATTED: QUESTIONS OF 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Lady Ashton is in fact triple–hatted, in that she also chairs the Foreign Affairs Council. She 
therefore combines three distinct functions: High Representative of CSFP, Vice-President of the 
Commission and Chair of the EU Foreign Affairs Council.  
In these three pillars the High Representative combines responsibility of the executive (the 
European Commission) with the legislative (the EU Council) together with a representative 
role. 
The question of scrutiny to ensure that some division of power remains and that the European 
Parliament and Member States retain some control to scrutinise policy implementation remains 
therefore acutely important. 
 
THE EEAS MANDATE VIS A VIS THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
 
An element that has been introduced during the negotiations is the idea that double-
hattedness would extend beyond the High Representative itself. 
In the course of negotiations double-hatted officials are appearing. The argument put forward 
is that the EEAS itself is a double-hatted service. Given that the Lisbon Treaty provides that an 
EEAS can be established to support the High Representative for Foreign Policy and Security, 
the Treaty does not envisage a service that itself has a double mandate. 
The provision in the Treaty for a double-hatted representative does not in any way allow the 
establishment of a service with a double mandate. 
The Lisbon Treaty provides unambiguously that the European Commission implements the EU 
budget. 
The Community areas which include development cooperation are the responsibility of the 
European Commission, and the European Parliament is responsible for the discharge of the 
implementation. 
The European Development Fund explicitly states that the European Commission will execute 
and implement the resources in line with the Cotonou Agreement. The Lisbon Treaty makes no 
distinction between regions, and the Development Cooperation Instrument and ENPI are 
equally within the remit of the European Commission, for all budget allocation matters. Only 
the European Commission can therefore be responsible for the National Indicative 
programmes. 
 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL VERSUS COMMUNITY 
 
There are some arguments circulating that the Lisbon Treaty does away with the distinction 
between intergovernmental and community policies. 
This is explicitly not the case.  
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The raison d’être of the double-hatted High Representative is precisely in the acceptance that 
foreign policy, defence and security remain at the heart of Member States sovereignty and are 
therefore strictly intergovernmental with cooperation enhanced through the EU Council, with 
the EEAS servicing its implementation where there is joint agreement. 
The Lisbon Treaty does not extend Foreign, Security and Defence Policy to common community 
policies. 
The European common policies, such as development policy and humanitarian assistance, are 
at the heart of the community policies, for which the European Commission is charged with 
implementation. 
 
CONSISTENCY AND COHERENCE 
 
If the EEAS were to bring the EU external policies together – for which there is no mandate in 
the Lisbon Treaty – a consistent proposal would bring together the entirety of EU external 
policies, including trade. 
The Lisbon Treaty does charge the High Representative with the responsibility to ensure the 
EU’s foreign policy is consistent with other areas and this coordinating role should be placed in 
the EEAS so as to assist the High Representative. 
The Lisbon Treaty also stipulates that all policies that impact on developing countries should 
take into account the objective of development cooperation, which is poverty eradication. The 
policies referred to in the treaty (§ 208) are all policies, including internal policies that can 
impact on developing countries, such as for instance the CAP. 
There is no intention in the treaty to suggest that all these policies should be incorporated in 
the EEAS, but there is a duty for the High Representative to ensure Foreign and Security Policy 




The European Union is often advanced through officials of Member States, officials of European 
institutions and others working on proposals and packages. It is good for the EU to advance on 
the basis of commonly accepted ideas and for such European notions to develop. 
However, the process of such fusion is a process taking place in administrations, which do not 
in themselves find a justification in the Treaty. 
On the contrary the Lisbon Treaty safeguards the specific roles of the institutions, defining the 
European Commission as independent from Member States individual interests charged with 
protecting the interests of the Union. The European Council reflects the individual interests of 
Member States. 
While the High Representative can be present in both as part of her double-hatted nature, a 
fusion of the institutions would undermine the balance of interests that the Lisbon Treaty has 
provided for between in the institutions. 
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INCREMENTAL CHANGE? 
 
A concern with the proposal to extend development cooperation into the EEAS is the process of 
incrementally changing the nature of the balance of power between the institutions. Whereas a 
small addition to the EEAS in development cooperation might seem to be relatively 
insignificant today, it provides the basis for much greater areas of policy making to be 
extended to the EEAS. 
With the EEAS not being defined as a service in the Commission, nor a service in the Council, it 
is an institutionless orphan, and it will be unclear how it is governed. If the current 
negotiations open up the path for a big service without a clear mandate the question whether 
this is in the interest of the European Union is justified. 
 
CONFLICT OF INTERESTS 
 
In defence of the Ashton proposals double-hatted officials are coming out with the idea that 
European Union Foreign and Security Policy are set up with the purpose of promoting soft 
policies, and that it will provide carrots to developing countries to promote this policy more 
effectively. 
First of all there is a question as to whether the post of High Representative for Foreign Affairs 
and Security policy was set up to only promote the EU’s soft power. 
Secondly, it denies the real conflicts of interests that do exist between EU policy areas and 
interests of developing countries, and therefore, the need to address objectives in such a way 
that the particular policy aims are promoted and not undermined. Whereas the EU’s trade 
policy legitimately and aggressively defends the interests of the EU economy, the EU’s 
development cooperation provides balance in having eradication of poverty as the central 
objective. They are different and require different instruments and whether or not policies are 
effective is measured in a different way. 
The EU development policy is based on the concept of a partnership, of promoting ownership 
of development cooperation by developing countries; this has been a welcome change away 
from previous approaches that had more (neo-)colonial points of departure. This idea of 
partnership, in respect of ownership, has to remain the central underpinning of the EU 
development policy. 
The proposal to integrate development cooperation in the EEAS has been defended on the 
basis of it helping the EU to offer carrots to developing countries (as opposed to brandishing 
sticks). It is questionable indeed if the developing countries will be interested in replacing 




Would double-hattedness become a possibility for some officials but not for all, then those few 
will become de facto decision-makers, with an unclear mandate, political accountability or 
scrutiny. 
Page | 5  
The Lisbon Treaty does not make provision for double-hatted officials – apart from the High 
Representative, and it has identified the Commission solely as the independent guardian of the 
EU treaties to promote the interests of the Union. It does not make a distinction between 
officials and this should remain the basis for a healthy executive. 
 
PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY AND SCRUTINY BY MEMBER STATES 
 
The danger with groups of double-hatted officials in the institutions will create a centre of 
power without any base in the Lisbon Treaty, and without clear references to scrutiny 
procedures. There is a real danger that this will increase the democratic deficit and will 
particularly harm the capacity of the European Parliament, national parliaments and the 
majority of member states.  It is likely to lead to control over EU future external policies being 




It is vital that the establishment of the EEAS complies with the spirit and intention of the 
Lisbon Treaty. 
 
The Treaty does not provide for double-hatted officials. It introduces a double-hatted High 
Representative, who is assisted with single-hatted officials for Foreign Policy and Security in 
the EEAS and single-hatted officials in the Commission for her duties as Vice President of the 
European Commission. 
 
The construction of the EEAS needs to be carefully monitored against the provisions in the 
Treaty, especially in relation to lines of accountability. 
 
